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Abstract The tension between equity and excellence is fundamental in science
policy. This tension might appear to be resolved through the use of merit-based
evaluation as a criterion for research funding. This is not the case. Merit-based
decision making alone is insufficient because of inequality aversion, a fundamental
tendency of people to avoid extremely unequal distributions. The distribution of
performance in science is extremely unequal, and no decision maker with the power
to establish a distribution of public money would dare to match the level of
inequality in research performance. We argue that decision makers who increase
concentration of resources because they accept that research resources should be
distributed according to merit probably implement less inequality than would be
justified by differences in research performance. Here we show that the conse-
quences are likely to be suppression of incentives for the very best scientists. The
consequences for the performance of a national research system may be substantial.
Decision makers are unaware of the issue, as they operate with distributional
assumptions of normality that guide our everyday intuitions.
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Introduction
The tension between excellence and equity in university research performance and
funding is a core science policy concern explored in a vast literature of descriptive
essays rich in contextual narrative. In contrast, this paper takes a somewhat formal,
quantitative and abstract approach to the topic. We offer a different approach in the
hope that our perspective can advance understanding of how to distribute research
funding in order to maximize a nation’s international-level research excellence.
With many countries entering a period of austerity, greater understanding of this
issue is urgently needed. In this paper, we cannot solve this problem, rather we
simply lay some of the groundwork for a future research agenda.
We approach the issue from a systems perspective. To do this we consider the
distribution of performance and funding within a research system. Distributional
thinking is uncommon, but arguably quite useful in thinking about science policy
problems. For example, sometimes research is described as ‘‘winner take all’’
because a few people are responsible for a very high percentage of the advances.
Winners are thus highly visible. Nevertheless, data demonstrate that there is a
distribution in performance, meaning that some people do perform at an
intermediate level. Because the ‘‘winner take all’’ shorthand misses this, it may
not be the best basis for policy. As a second example, powerful statistical techniques
are available to analyze normally distributed data. Arguably, this leads to a subtle
problem in which all data is seen as somehow normally distributed. Scientific
performance and therefore much data in science and technology studies are
distributed in a power law fashion. This data is invariably referred to as ‘‘highly
skewed.’’ Skew means asymmetrical. The unspoken and inaccurate subtext in the
common usage is that the data are some sort of badly misbehaving normal
distribution. Not true. The data are stranger and more difficult to handle than that
because the mean is not a useful statistic and variance is often infinite. It is the
differences between the characteristics of the normal and power law distribution and
their possible consequences for science policy that this paper articulates.
The argument proceeds as follows. The paper begins by discussing the
distinctions commonly made between probability distributions. There follows a
review of the empirical evidence that a power law distribution characterizes
research performance. Next, tensions between excellence and equity in the
distribution of research resources are discussed. Such tensions likely create a
mismatch between the distribution of research resources that would be ideal from
the viewpoint of maximizing research excellence and actual distributions based on
merit. We explore how this might reduce system performance.
The argument in the paper is fairly stylized in discussing the simple dyad of
‘‘funders’’ and ‘‘researchers’’ without committing to a particular unit of analysis.
Units of analysis can be tricky when discussing research funding, especially on the
researcher side. Universities are an obvious player, and research money is allocated
to them by government bodies in centralized systems. However, individuals are also
players, though the individual ‘‘PI’’ is something of a fiction in that a person’s
capacity for obtaining competitively awarded grant funding will be shaped by other
possible units of analysis – the department that provides a more or less conducive
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environment for research; groups, that is colleagues in various stages of career
development who collaborate with and work for the person, and in so doing shape
their ideas and help to execute their research; and the university, whose managerial
capacity is essential to qualify its employees as potential grant recipients. To whom
then is funding awarded – PI, group, department or university?
For better or worse, data availability often shapes choice of unit of analysis. Data
at departmental level emerges from national evaluation systems which tend to reify
this level. University level data is more broadly available internationally. But
committing to one unit of analysis may preclude full understanding. Geuna’s study
of the economics of university research at the university level illustrated this. He
was forced to abandon consistency in unit of analysis to explore micro-dynamics of
funding at the level of research centers to understand the implications of grant
mechanisms for the evolution of universities (Guena 1998, p.186). The discussion
here is largely conceptual and cannot hope to resolve these difficulties; therefore a
stylized funder/research dyad is used.
There is an important caveat to the argument of the paper. The argument applies
best to publicly funded university research. Universities teach as well as perform
research, and the distribution of performance in teaching quite likely differs from the
distribution of performance in research. Therefore, we do not address the distribution
of resources to universities as a whole, just the distribution of research resources.
The Characteristics of Probability Distributions
Probability distributions are embedded in analytical work and, we would argue, in
our assumptions about how the world works. The most powerful statistical
techniques assume data is in a normal distribution or a variant thereof. Analytical
training embeds this view of the world within us, and analysts seek to transform any
dataset into a normally distributed dataset so that their techniques can be used. Our
everyday experience leads us to unconsciously assume most things are distributed
like the things we know best, such as height or intelligence, in which a few people are
short, a few are quite tall (but nobody is 20 feet tall) and most people are somewhere
in the middle. Unfortunately, when the world does not conform to the normal
distribution, our analytical and everyday assumptions can obscure understanding.
Probability distributions are commonly distinguished along several dimensions
including mathematical descriptions, symmetry and tails. The fundamental
description of a distribution is its mathematical function: normal, exponential,
power law (in specific applications also referred to as Pareto, Lotka, Zipf), Poisson,
negative binomial, chi-square etc. However, this, the most precise characterization
of distributions, does not exhaust the useful distinctions that can be made.
Symmetry is important in analytical work and is the basis for a second
categorization. Asymmetric distributions are labeled ‘‘skew,’’ or in the case of
data in the realm of science and technology - ‘‘highly skewed’’. The very term
embodies an assumption that the distribution in question is a misbehaving normal
distribution which technique (e.g logarithmic transformation) can regularize.
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A third increasingly common categorization addresses the outlying values in a
distribution or the ‘‘tail.’’ When financial analysts found that disaster struck their
portfolios more often than their models predicted, they traced the trouble to their
distributional assumptions. Research in risk management now focuses on ‘‘fat tail’’
distributions in which the frequency of extreme values at the high or low end is
higher than would be predicted by the normal or exponential distributions, which
are both ‘‘thin tailed’’ distributions (they are related, the high end of a normal
distribution decays exponentially). Work on fat tailed distributions is also propelled
by research on computer networks which have fat tailed characteristics. Power law
distributions have fat tails; normal distributions have thin tails.
The power law is a very unequal distribution. Figure 1 illustrates the difference in
inequality between a normal and power law distribution as measured by the Gini
coefficient.1 Figure 1a shows a power law and a normal distribution of resources. The
distributions were constructed so that they contain the same number of people, 988,
and cover the same range: in both distributions somebody has $1 of resources and one
person has $100 of resources. The normal distribution has a mean of 50 and a standard
deviation of 20. The power law distribution has a constant of 231 and an exponent of
1.12. The Lorenz curves for these distributions are displayed in Figure 1b. The Lorenz
curve for the normal distribution is much closer to the line of equality than is the curve
for the power law distribution. Therefore, the Gini coefficient of the normal
distribution at 0.21 is smaller than the Gini coefficient of the power law distribution
which is 0.66.3 The Gini coefficient tells us that those seeking egalitarian distributions
will prefer the normal distribution over the power law distribution.
Power Law Distribution of Research Performance
Alfred Lotka, an employee of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in New
York, was the first to examine the frequency distribution of scientific productivity.
In 1926, Lotka counted the number of papers published by individuals with names
beginning with the letters A and B in 10 years of Chemical Abstracts, and the
number of papers in an index of important physics papers (Lotka 1926). He
1 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality that ranges between 0 and 1 with 0 representing perfect
equality where everyone has the same resources and 1 representing perfect inequality where one person
has all the income while everyone else has zero income. The Gini coefficient was originally based on the
average of the absolute differences between all pairs of incomes in the distribution and defined to be the
ratio of half of that average to the mean of the distribution (Dorfman, 1979). Today the Gini coefficient is
commonly explained in geometric terms using Lorenz curves. For any income distribution, the Lorenz
curve is constructed from data ordered ascending by share of resources. It plots the cumulative share of
income against the cumulative share of population. If everyone had the same income, the curve would be
a straight line at a 45 degree angle. This line is plotted on graphs of Lorenz curves and is called the ‘‘line
of equality.’’ If one person had all the income, the curve would be a vertical line at 100% of the
population. The Gini coefficient is a ratio between two areas: 1) the area between the line of equality and
the Lorenz curve and 2) the total area under the line of equality.
2 The equations for the power law is p(x) = Cx-n for x[ xmin
3 Gini coefficients calculated using Wessa, P. (2008), Free Statistics Software, Office for Research
Development and Education, version 1.1.22-r4, URL http://www.wessa.net/
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reported an ‘‘inverse square law of scientific productivity’’ according to which
‘‘the proportion of all contributors who contribute a single item should be just
over 60 per cent.’’ In other words, he found scientific productivity followed a
power law.
Since then, a great deal of work has examined distributions of scientific
productivity at all levels of analysis from individual to national and has calculated
the values of the exponent on the power law. Recently questions have been raised
about the methods used to empirically detect and characterize power laws,
specifically Clauset et al. believe standard methods are not refined enough and too
many distributions are being identified as power laws. According to Clauset et al.
(2009), ‘‘standard methods such as least-squares fitting are known to produce
systematically biased estimates of parameters for power-law distributions.’’ Clauset
et al. use maximum likelihood methods and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic to
reexamine twenty datasets previously found to follow a power law, including
scientific productivity. They find moderate support for the identification of the
distributions of author productivity and citations as a power law. We conclude that
even using the most advanced methods, scientific productivity and citations are
likely distributed in a power law.
In this case, the power law distribution reflects an underlying mechanism of
cumulative advantage. The sociologist Robert Merton first identified this mecha-
nism and called it the Matthew effect. More recently, the term ‘‘preferential
attachment’’ is used, meaning that a quantity is distributed among individuals
according to how much they already have. For example, well cited papers attract
more citations and uncited papers continue to be ignored.
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Fig. 1 Distributions and Lorenz curves for a normal and power law distribution
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Equity versus Excellence in Research Funding Distribution
The role of cumulative advantage in scientific performance establishes a conflict
between efficiency and equity considerations in the public funding of research. This
conflict is endemic (Feller 2001). It was visible in the post World War II debate in the
United States over the establishment of the National Science Foundation. Senator
Harley Kilgore, from West Virginia, who worried about concentrations of power, held
hearings on general government support of research and development and produced a
report and a bill that proposed a well-funded agency that, among other things, would
distribute research funding largely on a state-by-state formula. Vannevar Bush, an MIT
engineer, president of the Carnegie Institution and leader of the wartime R&D effort,
believed, among other things, that the notion of geographic distribution was
inconsistent with maintaining a high quality of science (Morin 1993, 18-21). After
much debate and delay, the National Science Foundation was established following the
Bush vision, awarding grants based on peer review judgments of scientific excellence.
Several decades later Congress reacted badly to the extremely unequal
distribution of Federal research resources across states (California and Massachu-
setts get far more in Federal research support than any other state). NSF was
directed to avoid ‘‘undue concentration’’ of research and education and so
established EPSCOR so that researchers in states at the bottom of the performance
distribution could compete amongst themselves for a pool of research funding with
the idea that this would build capacity and eventually states would ‘‘graduate’’ from
the program (Wu 2010). Congressional earmarking of research funding often is
justified as providing more distributional equity in research funding (Feller 2001).
More recently in Europe, Framework program funding has required that
collaborative partners from weaker scientific countries be included on proposals
with the aim of strengthening capacity. European research funding has also been
subject to pressure for juste retour - or the principle that the distribution of European
funding across countries should match the contributions countries make to the
European budget. The European Research Council was established to escape this by
quite explicitly funding research only on criteria of peer reviewed excellence
irrespective of geographic considerations.
Beyond political and institutional self-interest, there are likely deep seated
psychological preferences underpinning the high public value placed on equity. The
results of behavioral economics and most recently neurobiology suggest that egalitarian
preferences are quite deeply ingrained in human nature (Amiel & Cowell 1999; Dawes
et al. 2007; Tricomi et al. 2010). The fundamental preference for greater equality in
resource distribution within a group of which one is a part is called inequality aversion.
Given our aversion to inequality, even decision makers seeking to foster research
excellence through peer review processes would be extremely uncomfortable with the
degree of inequality in resource allocation that would be required to match the
performance distribution. The resulting mismatch between performance and resource
distributions would compromise the efficiency of the allocation.
How do funders move resources towards a power law when they wish to more
closely match the distribution of output? In many countries outside the United
States, a considerable portion of core research resources are allocated to national
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universities by a decision maker in an annual funding round. In the past the funding
was allocated using a formula based on student and/or faculty numbers. This
method satisfies concerns about equity. The trend is to introduce systems in which
part of the allocation is based on assessments of research output. The stated goals of
governments introducing these systems include encouraging research excellence.
Another class of mechanism might be termed ‘‘select few’’ policies, meaning
give large amounts of money to a few contenders. This is done in centers of
excellence schemes (Japan and Germany currently attempting) and in large grants to
young people (examples: NSF Career awards and European grants to young people).
Injecting large amounts of money into a system in this way can in itself shift the
overall shape of the distribution. In addition, there is a multiplier effect. The ‘‘select
few’’ winners of one competition will carry the halo of being one of the select few
into future funding competitions, enhancing their subsequent chances of success.
Competitive grant programs with low success rates are also a kind of ‘‘select
few’’ policy. Geuna pointed out that a cumulative mechanism is also at work when
multiple grant programs are available. Geuna found that winners of national grants
felt they were more likely to get EU grants and vice versa (Geuna 1998).
Cumulative mechanisms in growing systems are one of the known generators of fat
tail, power law distributions. Such mechanisms have long been referred to as the
‘‘Matthew effect’’ in science studies.
Note that within this framework, innovation prizes can be viewed as a power law
compatible distribution system. In particular, the X Prize Foundation ‘‘creates and
manages prizes that drive innovators to solve some of the greatest challenges facing
the world today.’’ Their mission is ‘‘to bring about radical breakthroughs for the
benefit of humanity’’ (xprize.org). They do this by establishing high-reward
competitions to solve challenging scientific and engineering problems. Their first
prize was the Ansari X Prize of $10 million which went to Burt Rutan for the first
private suborbital space flight. In this process, what would constitute excellence
must be pre-specified, and competitions are more innovation than science oriented.
Because large amounts of money are given to the top performer, prizes have the
potential to greatly increase inequality in resource distribution. Congress has
recently allowed agencies to begin offering prizes so these two sentences are now
out of date.
Two legitimate sets of public values contest for primacy in the allocation of
research funding. Governments seek to maximize research excellence by distrib-
uting resources based on merit. Governments also enhance equity with a broad
geographic distribution of research funds to support economic development,
strengthen research and enhance diversity and participation in the research
enterprise. Here we suggest that it is quite likely that our merit-based distributions
are shaped by equity considerations, and that this might not be optimal.
Research Resource Distribution Example
In this section, we examine one process for distributing research resources, the RAE
exercise in the UK, because it illustrates the tendency to avoid distributing resources
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in a power law. The British government periodically evaluates the research in its
universities through the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) in order to inform the
distribution of general support for research to universities. In 2001, the RAE was a
peer review evaluation of the research output of each department on a seven point
scale. The peer review panels know that their scores will be translated into
departmental funding and so their judgments can be considered funding allocation
decisions. As stated above, given what we know about the distribution of research
performance, the distribution of research output, such as papers, across UK
university departments must follow a power law. Since the RAE scores assess
research performance, they should also be distributed across departments in a power
law. They are not.
In 2001 the RAE panels turned in a hill shaped distribution of grades to the
government. Figure 2a reports the grades assigned to all UK departments
submitting to the 2001 RAE exercise, 2,598 in all. The Gini coefficient of this
distribution is 0.157.4 This set of grades was used through 2007 in allocating
research resources. That the distribution of RAE grades does not reflect the known
distribution of research performance; that the RAE scores take a hill shape not a
power law shape and that the hill shape contains less inequality than would be
expected from differences in research performance exemplifies the questions we are
raising here.
The curious aspect of this exercise is the distribution of research resources that
results. The UK government uses a formula to translate the grades into resource
allocations. In addition to RAE grades, the formula takes into account size of
department, scientific field, location in or out of London and other factors. As we are
exploring the part of funding seeking to encourage research excellence through peer
review judgments (and not the part focused on distributional equity) we display a
stylized RAE-based resource distribution derived only from the weightings
allocated to each grade. Table 1 displays the ‘‘QR weightings’’ used to translate
grades into resources for several years. Although the grades stayed the same, the
weightings changed each year. Figure 2b displays the resource distribution that
would have resulted in 2002 if all departments were of the same size, in the same
field, outside of London etc. The distribution is a hill with a Gini coefficient
of 0.436. The most dramatic change in QR weightings came in 2003 when the
funding distribution became more reminiscent of a power law (minimum is mode,
monotonic decrease to largest value), see Figure 2c. Thereafter, minor
changes were made in the weightings that accentuated inequality.5 The Gini
coefficient of the resource distribution in 2003 was 0.510 and in 2007 was 0.528?.6
4 Gini coefficient calculated by translating grades onto a 1 through 7 scale.
5 Between 2003 and 2007, the weighting given to grade 4 did not change. Grade 5 gained 14% and Grade
5* gained 30%. In addition, in 2003 a pool of money was made available to departments that had attained
5* in both the 2001 and 1996 RAE exercises. This money further accentuates the slide and is referred to
as the ‘‘super 5* premium’’ in the table. The exact effect is not known here but is suggested by an arrow
and a question mark in the graph.
6 The empirical, non-stylized story is more complex. During this period the inequality in the funding
distributed decreased because other elements in the final distribution formula were unrelated to research
performance. In 2007, HEFCE commented that the increase in inequality seen here was meant to
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The RAE data support the suggestion that people making peer review judgments
of research excellence may not be able to allocate resources in a way that mirrors
the distribution of research performance.
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Fig. 2 UK RAE and resource distribution RAE grades obtained from HEFCE, 2007b. 2002 weights
obtained from HEFCE, 2002, p. 18. 2003 weights obtained from HEFCE, 2003, p. 16. 2007 weights
obtained from HEFCE, 2007a, p. 21
Footnote 6 continued
counterbalance these other elements in the formula that were not quality weighted: ‘‘There has been a
modest increase in the steepness of the selectivity scale within mainstream QR, to counterbalance the fact
that RDP supervision and QR charity support funds are not quality weighted, other than for the threshold
criterion that activity must be in departments rated 4 or above.’’ From letter to Vice-chancellor Exeter
from HEFCE in 2007, admin.exeter.ac.uk/ppr/GrantLetterMarch07_0119.doc.
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The Implications of Mismatched Distributions of Performance and Resources
We have argued that for reasons of political values as well as our in-built aversion to
inequality, there is likely to be a mismatch between the distributional form of
research output and merit-based research funding allocations. Data on RAE
judgments though not definitive, is publicly available and provides some support to
our contention. If the argument is correct, we need to ask: so what? Would any
mismatch have consequences? In this section, we examine the possibility that a
mismatch in performance and resource distribution would reduce the overall
research excellence obtainable in the system.
In order to examine the consequences of a mismatch, we need to model the
distribution of resources. The RAE data suggest that a normal distribution would
serve as an illustration. Giving everybody the same amount of research funding,
which is clearly egalitarian, would violate merit-based principles of research
resource distribution. To move away from egalitarian distribution, one awards better
performers somewhat more money and poor performers somewhat less. The likely
outcome is some variant of a Gaussian distribution.
As mentioned above, the power law distribution has a much higher degree of
inequality than the normal distribution. One further point about inequality is worth
considering here. Decision makers influenced by inequality aversion will be highly
sensitive to the tails of the distributions they create (Amiel and Cowell 1999;
Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Dawes et al. 2007). In the normal distribution above,
30 people receive $1,000, 106 people get $7,000 (the mean), and at the maximum one
person gets $19,000. In the power law version, 427 people get $1,000, more than half
get less than $3,000, and at the maximum one person gets $80,000. The minimum-
maximum range of the normal distribution is one-quarter that of the power law, and
the number of people stuck at the minimum in the power law is 14 times that of the
normal distribution. Therefore, the normal will be preferred over the power law by
inequality averse decision makers sensitized to the extremes of the distribution.
We explore the implications of the mismatch between a normal distribution of
resources and a power law distribution of performance using quantiles. For
illustrative purposes, power law and normal functions were constructed and divided
into deciles. The power law was constructed to reflect Lotka’s original formulation
that 60% of the people publish one paper only. The normal distribution has mean 50
Table 1 QR weightings used
with 2001 RAE grades
Grade 2002 2003 2007
1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
3b 0 0 0
3a .31 0 0
4 1 1 1
5 1.89 2.79 3.175
5* 2.71 3.36 4.036 ? super
5* premium
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with standard deviations 30. For the top four deciles and the rest, Figure 3 reports
the share of output produced assuming a power law distribution and the share of
resources received assuming a normal distribution
First, note that in a true egalitarian distribution of funding, the top 40% of
researchers would receive 40% of research resources and the bottom 60% would
receive 60% of resources. In contrast, the normal distribution of resources gives the
top 40% most productive researchers more funding (59%) and the bottom 60% of
researchers less funding (41%) than they would receive under an egalitarian
distribution in which every decile would receive 10% of funding. The normal
distribution is thus a merit-based distribution of funding.
Although the world in which productivity followed the Lotka distribution and
research resources were distributed normally might improve upon the world of flat
distribution of funding, we can still find reason to question the resource distribution.
In this scenario, the top 10% of research performers would split 20% of the
available research resources, which is more than any other decile, but far less than
the 60% they might expect if resources were commensurate with their output. In the
second decile in contrast, researchers split 15% of the resources, which is more than
the 12% of output they produce. The same is true for the rest of the deciles in the top
40%; in each decile the researchers split a greater share of resources than they
produce in output.
To the extent that obtaining more resources for research7 provides any motivation
and incentive for researchers in their work, researchers might want to avoid the top
10% because the rewards are so much less than the output produced. But we can say
more. Assume that attaining the top 10% is more trouble than it is worth, where
might strategic researchers aim to position themselves? The best place appears to be
the 10-20% decile because researchers in that decile split more resources than any
below them, while still earning a premium on their output share. In other words, the
Fig. 3 Comparison of resource
and output distributions
7 Not salary increases, but rather grant funding to buy equipment and hire students and post-docs and pay
summer salary.
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proposition here is that researchers might aim high but not too high in a system
where resources are distributed by inequality averse decision makers.
This proposition finds some qualitative support in real life situations. Gla¨ser et al.
reviewed responses to the UK RAE system and argued that the literature can be read
as suggesting that the RAE (and indeed other evaluation-based methods of research
funding) ‘‘improve quality to the upper middle level and drive out low quality
research but suppress excellence to a certain extent’’ (Gla¨ser et al. 2002, p. 22). This
analysis confirms the suspicion of RAE observers in that the 10-20% decile is
indeed ‘‘upper middle’’ and appears to be a more desirable location than achieving
excellence among the top 10% in a system in which resources are awarded on merit-
based judgments which do not fully mirror the distribution of research performance.
The concern of the National Science Foundation with transformative research
arguably expresses the same worry. Arden Bement, former director of NSF, explained
transformative research as ‘‘a range of endeavors, which promise extraordinary
outcomes; such as, revolutionizing entire disciplines, creating entirely new fields, or
disrupting accepted theories and perspectives’’ (Bement 2007).8 If the output
distribution discussed here is seen as a distribution of impact, transformative research
can be interpreted as directing attention to the very high end of the long tail in the power
law output distribution. Implicit in current NSF initiatives to enhance their support of
transformative research is an assessment that they were previously failing to support
enough transformative research. This can be restated as: NSF is worried that their
evaluation-based methods of research funding suppress excellence to a certain extent.
Discussion
In this paper, we propose that there is a tension between distributions of research
performance and merit-based research funding decision making. In effect we argue
that decision makers who increase concentration of resources because they accept
that research performance differs, and that resources should be distributed according
to merit, probably implement less inequality than might be justified by differences
in research performance. If they did they would be accused of fostering ‘‘undue
concentration.’’ Any resource distribution that truly mirrored the distribution of
research performance would be untenable in the public realm because of its extreme
degree of inequality.
Our argument is stylized and there are several factors that may mitigate this
effect in real life. The first is the observation that after producing a particularly
noteworthy breakthrough, researchers, at least in the U.S., can find themselves in the
position of having more money than they can productively spend. In other words,
real life laboratories can become saturated with resources that arrive after the fact.9
8 Bement also expects the pursuit of transformative research to be high risk. There is overlap in the
formal analysis of risk and inequality, therefore it is not a surprise that when people discuss something
distributed so unequally as is research output and impact, that they regularly note the unaccustomed level
of risk involved.
9 Personal communication, Juan Rogers, January 2008, based on interviews with researchers responsible
for key discoveries in nanotechnology.
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That the saturation level of resources is less than commensurate with the laboratory
contribution to the progress of knowledge may make this argument moot. Others
would disagree, for example John Reed, the most highly cited scientist in cell
biology and current holder of 11 NIH grants worth almost $11 million, who states
that: ‘‘The evidence is that some labs and some people can handle a larger
portfolio’’ (quoted in Hand 2008).
The second factor that runs counter to the proposition is that real life researchers
may seek status rather than monetary return to their endeavors. Status, as expressed
in prizes, invitations to speak, job offers and general acclaim (if we could measure it
accurately) might well follow a power law distribution as it does not seem like it
would be subject to the pressures of inequality aversion and distributional equity
that attach to material resources. If real life researchers are concerned only with
status, and work in a system with many visible markers of status, the details of
monetary returns to performance may not be particularly salient, given that in every
merit-based system they see some monetary return to their high performance.
However, prizes and acclaim alone do not enable a person to conduct further
research. Those motivated to continue in research and indeed to compete at the
highest level in their fields need the time, equipment and talent that funding buys.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined a fundamental tension in science policy, that
between equity and excellence. Although using merit-based evaluation as a criterion
for research funding would seem to resolve this tension, we argue here that this is
unlikely. Merit-based decision making alone is insufficient because of inequality
aversion, a fundamental tendency of people to avoid extremely unequal distribu-
tions. The distribution of performance in science is extremely unequal, and a
decision maker distributing public money in a way that matched the level of
inequality in performance would be accused of undue concentration. In fact,
decision makers are likely unaware of the issue, as they no doubt operate with
distributional assumptions of normality that guide our everyday intuitions.
This argument may matter to those who seek to optimize both the research
excellence in a system and efficiency of funding allocations. If all researchers were
indifferent to the amount of money they received for their research, or if rewarding
research performance with more resources to conduct research destroyed every-
body’s intrinsic motivation and so reduced motivation, or if it were impossible to
distinguish the top 10% of researchers from the next decile, these quantitative
relationships would have no real world import. However, if even some researchers
seek to maximize the resources available for their research activities, and expect
allocation of resources to relate to their achievements and effort, then these ideas
may be relevant to overall system performance.
We did not argue that an egalitarian distribution of resources would produce an
even distribution of output, any distribution of resources would result in a power law
distribution of output. However, if one wants to optimize system performance with
scarce resources, identifying the best resource distribution becomes relevant.
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Because research output is a power law and this is a fat tailed distribution, overall
system performance will be highly dependent on the top of the distribution. This is
precisely where the mismatch between normal resource distribution preference and
power law performance distribution is greatest because it is where people are most
sensitive to resource inequality.
However, the arguments in the paper will remain conjectures until properly
constructed empirical comparisons of funding and performance distributions can be
analyzed over time and across countries.
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